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Abstract 
As the international economy is characterized by severe instability and a fluorescing 
mistrust of the general population towards leadership on a global scale, blame has to be 
assigned whilst the public reprobation craves for retribution. In the light of the above, 
corporate governance mechanisms have been indicated as liable parties, although there 
are economists raising attention to scapegoating phenomena. 
This study represents a systematic attempt in determining the complex interrelationship 
between corporate governance and bank performance during the period of 2003 to 2009 
covering both the core of the crisis and the years building up to it. 
The overall results of this study contradict the involvement of corporate governance 
mechanisms indicating an immunity of bank performance to their ratings, with only one 
variable (Tobin’s Q) exhibiting a dependency to CGQ Industry ratings (2003-2009). 
These results are in good coherence with previous studies, when however reducing the 
examined timeframe to the last three years of this period, neither CGQ nor their sub-
scores seem to have affected the banking sector, indicating that other factors must have 
dictated the global decline of their performance. It is noteworthy that especially during 
the years 2008 and 2009 a strong negative enslavement of bank performance to 
corporate governance mechanisms was observed, primarily concerning ROA and 
Tobin’s Q.  
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I. Introduction 
The global financial system is experiencing, what is widely considered as the severest 
economic crisis since the Great Depression, encountered in 1929 (Cheffins, 2009, Eli, 
2009). Initiating in 2007, with the collapse of US subprime mortgage market, the crisis 
led to a low interest rate environment (Brunnermeier, 2009), harboring a slowdown in 
economic activity, which reemerged as a recession, finally escalating into an 
unexpected financial break down. Experts labeled the phenomenon as local, but they 
soon stood to be corrected, as the instability swiftly extended to a global crisis. In 2007 
the nationwide mortgage crisis in the US, intensified into an impasse for the homeland’s 
banking system, turned into an international banking crisis and led to the decline of  an 
already trembling global economy (Beedikter, 2011).  
Today, there exists a consensus among leading financial minds, that the origin of this 
crisis can be, to some extent, attributed to the shortcomings of corporate governance 
mechanisms (Kirkpatrick, 2008). It is believed, that the inadequate standards set by 
these mechanisms, along with a constant tendency towards globalization, fostered the 
evolution of a local housing sector crisis into a disastrous worldwide economic 
slowdown.  
This investigation, represents a systematic attempt to encapture the significance of 
corporate governance standards and whether these affected the bank performance in the 
US over the period 2003-2009, covering not only the crucial period of the crisis but also 
the years leading up to it. 
The purpose of this empirical study is to determine possible associations, between bank 
performance and existing corporate governance principles, so as to establish whether 
corporate mechanisms can be blamed for nowadays situation. Financial researchers and 
regulators seem to have a keen interest in this topic, as many national and international 
organisations continuously conduct research in order to establish, if and to what extent 
these mechanisms influenced economic key figures prior or during the global crisis.  
This matter has been hitherto addressed by many researchers (Spong and Sullivan, 
2007, Cornett et al, 2010, Bermig and Frick, 2010), as studies have been triggered not 
only by corporate scandals such as the ones of Enron, WorldCom or Parmalat, but also 
by the recent economic recession. This investigation is intended as a supplement to 
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existing inquiries and will focus on the interrelation of bank performance and corporate 
governance. Using a sample of 169 publicly traded banks situated in the US, with both, 
poor and strong corporate governance ratings, a correlation of their rating to 
performance will be claimed and a comparative evaluation to previous studies 
conducted.  
This investigation will emphasize on the timeframe encompassing the actual crisis 
(2007-2009), a period which to the best of our knowledge has yet to be studied, due to 
the contemporary nature of the phenomenon, as well as on a period which encompasses 
years prior to the economic recession (2003-2009). 
The approach in terms of corporate governance ratings will be twofold and based on: 
 a summary of CGQ Industry rating and  
 sub-scores corporate governance rating, 
while several other financial measures will be considered, in order to quantify their 
effect on bank performance. Preliminary the period from 2003 to 2009 will be examined 
in its entirety, and following this, the last three years will be highlighted. 
The study briefly outlines the core of the financial industry, both in the US and 
worldwide and depicts the corporate governance framework, enumerating existing 
theories and trends that are encountered in implicated economies. This followed by a 
critical evaluation, in Section II, of the existing literature. Sections III and IV will 
sustain the main purpose of this investigation, revealing indicators, methods, statistics 
and equations that will be employed to analyze existing data. Finally, in Section V a 
general conclusion will be cited, followed by some recommendations based on findings. 
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Ia. Financial Industry 
The history of financial system goes back almost 12,000 years. At that time, the kind of 
financial exchanges among people had the form of assets transactions, where the most 
valuable objects were exchanged. This kind of exchange was embodied in the 
conception of the current banking system (Davidson, 2008). In addition, while at first 
financial transactions were restricted only to local traders, the evolution of the world 
contributed to the expansion of financial services, leading to an international banking 
and financial system. 
Nowadays, financial industry is one of the biggest industries worldwide, while it is also 
ranging among the most important ones, consisting of a wide range of companies and 
institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, securities traders, security exchanges 
etc. Financial Industry is a strong foundation to other industries too, as it underpins 
other sectors to expand and prosper. Financial sector’s aggregate income reveals the 
value that other industries ascribe to these services (Philippon, 2008). According to 
Forbes Annual Report, 7 out of 10 top companies worldwide belong to the financial 
sector.   
However, the form of today’s financial sector has nothing to do with that of some 
decades ago, where its services were much limited or separated. In the U.S. during mid-
1960’s, financial services were divided into three main categories: banking, insurance 
and securities. Banking services consisted of lending and saving money, insurance 
companies were occupied with property, casualty and life insurances, while securities 
businesses dealt with advice, brokerage and underwriting. Regulation at that time was 
tight, while these services were not classified to the high-growth businesses. By the 
1980’s, the financial services had been transformed, with firms providing loans, 
securities, insurances and several new financial services that until then were not in their 
portfolio or at least were not combined . The old unilateral model of services was no 
longer considered to be a competitive business and was superseded by the new “lender-
broker-dealer-adviser” model (Smith et al. 2006). By the end of 1990’s, intergraded 
firms were expanded to global markets, with capital raising, lending and merger advice 
covering more than 80% of market share (Smith et al. 2006). At that time financial 
services were divided into two categories: retail market that dealt with consumers and 
wholesale market that were banks, governments and corporations that had access to 
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capital markets, while the market was aggressive and highly competitive. The 
international character and the blending of financial services commenced in mid-1980’s, 
when several institutions started to operate abroad with a wide range of activities. In the 
US, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Actᵃ is the one that allowed in the late-1990’s, to merge 
different types of companies that belonged to financial services. This new regulation 
gave the opportunity to financial institutions to combine both saving money on behalf of 
their customers, while at the same time make investments for them. The vantage for the 
financial institutions was that due to the combination of these two actions, they were 
able to perform well both in good and unfavorable economic conditions, at least for a 
short period of time, enabling them to finance the booming “home buying” in  the 
1990’s (U.S. market) by offering subprime and adjustable rate mortgagesᵇ.  
Nowadays, financial industry is reformed due to globalization, deregulation, and the 
recent financial crisis. The U.S. and other developed economies worldwide try to harden 
their regulation and financial standards in an attempt to prevent another economic 
meltdown. International bodies such as the IMF and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervisionᵈ are working towards a more transparent, stable and efficient financial 
system by adopting various legislative measures at times, such as the Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP) in 1998 by IMF and the Basel I (1988), Basel II (2006), and Basel 
III (2009) by the Basel Committee. 
 
We cannot know what the future will look like for this industry, as many banks and 
other financial institutions were being blamed for fraud and misleading, however, there 
are too many factors that could help to the recovery of financial services, with better 
corporate governance mechanisms being on the focal point of debates. 
 
 
 
 
a. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) was approved by President of U.S. Bill Clinton in 1999 and opened the market between 
securities, insurance and banking companies. This enabled them to act as a combination of a commercial bank, and investment bank 
and an insurance company, while allowed them to be intergraded. 
b. In the late 2005, delinquency rates on subprime adjustable rate mortgages began rising from less that 4 per cent to over 10 per 
cent in September 2007. At the same time, growth rate for such mortgages continued to expand rapidly. Due to rising house prices, 
actual investor losses were minimal until 2007.Between 2000 and 2006, outstanding mortgage loans increased from USD 4.8 trillion 
to nearly USD 9.8 trillion, a rise of 13 per cent a year. During the same period, loans to subprime borrowers tripled and at the end of 
2006 accounted for 12 per cent of all mortgages (IOSCO, 2008). 
c. FSAP seeks to indentify the strengths and vulnerabilities of a country’s financial system, to determine how key sources of risk are 
being managed, to ascertain the sector’s developmental and technical assistance needs, and to help prioritize policy responses 
(OECD, 2004) 
d. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was found in 1975 in an attempt to provide guidance regarding banking 
supervisory issues, and international standards on capital adequacy. BCBS purpose is to encourage monetary and financial stability 
worldwide and to foster international cooperation. (BIS.org) 
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Ib. Corporate Governance Framework 
Corporate governance definition is multifaceted. For many researchers and regulators, 
corporate governance is the way companies are directed and controlled, while for others 
is the mean by which companies and society can prosper. Several theories have been 
developed during the years and due to the different manner corporations operate across 
countries. It is important to mention some of the most widespread theories of corporate 
governance as are still considered to be the fundamental stone for many corporations.    
One of the most famous theories that have been developed, is the agency theory, a 
shareholder oriented theory, which is rested on the separation of ownership and control, 
while agency problems arise from conflicts of interest between principles (shareholders) 
and agents (managers). Another theory is the Stakeholder theory, which is considered to 
be well-known for its social-oriented approach, as in this aspect, companies have an 
impact on society and are accountable not only to shareholders but to stakeholders too. 
Finally, a less expanded theory is the transaction costs theory in which companies are 
trying to internalize transactions for which the cost is higher in the market. Transaction 
costs theory advocates the problem to the fact that managers try to square company’s 
transactions with their own interest (opportunism) and the limited information and time 
they have (bounded rationality), while this activities need to be controlled from 
shareholders. 
However, corporate governance practices vary across countries and that is why a unified 
corporate governance system couldn’t be applicable worldwide. US had always a keen 
interest on corporate governance and pursued a more shareholder-oriented approach, as 
that of agency theory. US focus more on market-based systems of corporate 
governance, with shareholders being the leading actors. Although UK has also been 
market-oriented, what diversifies it from the US is remuneration practices and board 
culture. While Anglo-American system is widely expanded, German corporate 
governance is placed opposite the first one. German companies have displayed an 
impressive growth the last decades, with many academics attributing this success to 
their way of governing a corporation. What lends variety to this system compared to 
others, is that German corporate governance is relationship-based, focusing on long-
term investments, while Anglo-American confronts short-termism problems, restricting 
in that way their financial investments and thus the financial prosperity of the country. 
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Another framework that is worth to be mentioned is that of Southern European 
countries, which prevails in Greece and Italy. Corporate governance in these countries is 
characterized by family ownership systems “and therefore falls into the insider-oriented 
model” (Solomon, 2010). In this model, companies are either family-owned or owned 
through a cross-company shareholdings structure. Finally, another important and well-
established system is that of East Asian and most particularly of Japan. Economy there, 
is based on zaibatsu (Kaen, 2003), a group of family-owned businesses. This insider-
dominated structure of corporate governance is characterized by little takeover activity, 
while shares are not traded so frequently as in the market-oriented system. In contrast to 
the Anglo-American system, Japanese companies are relationship-based, concentrating 
ownership on few, eliminating in that way agency problems that could be spotted on a 
more market-oriented corporate governance system. 
It is evident that the past few decades have experienced an increasing interest in 
corporate governance, with countries espousing a specific model/theory that 
characterizes them. However, scandals as that of Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat have 
contributed to the growing need for optimum corporate governance mechanisms. 
Reforms of these standards have become a hot topic in a national as well as in an 
international level. International bodies, such as the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), endeavor to implement new corporate 
governance standards or meliorate existing ones. Moreover, national governments are 
trying to strengthen their corporate governance mechanisms especially after the recent 
economic crisis. This financial slowdown has not only led corporate governance to the 
center of the global stage, but also altered the emphasis given to it, as prior to global 
financial crisis, advertence was given only to board performance, while now risk 
management, internal control and remuneration systems are also deemed to be 
important. 
This change of direction is apparent due to some actions taken by local and “global” 
governments as mentioned before. In the UK, Turner Review, published in 2009, 
identifies three causes leading to the recent economic meltdown: “macro-economic 
imbalances, financial innovation of little social value and important deficiencies in the 
key bank capital and liquidity regulation”. This Review tries to make improvements 
that focus on a more “macro-prudential” target rather than on specific firms and 
operations. Similarly, Walker Review, published the same year, makes some notable 
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recommendations on corporate governance in UK banks and other financial institutions, 
while it holds ineffective remuneration structures and excessive risk-taking culpable for 
the awkward predicament of the banking system. 
In U.S. much attention has been given also to corporate governance standards long time 
before global financial crisis, with the publishing of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 
being one of the most important steps towards a better system. Ali and Gregoriou, 2006, 
suggest that the introduction of SOX serves four purposes: “it creates new structures to 
regulate both the audit process and the profession, increases the responsibilities and 
liabilities of corporate boards for failure to insure against future malfunction, provides 
protection for internal whistleblowers and enhances the authority of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to police the market”. 
Moreover, as globalization forced countries to act as a whole in order to protect their 
financial systems against a presumable collapse, many international bodies took action. 
OECD introduced in 2004 the “OECD Principles of Corporate Governance” in an 
attempt to provide policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders with 
“specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both OECD and non-
OECD countries” (Johnston, OECD Secretary-General, 2004). In addition, Basel 
Committee issued in 2006 guidance in order to promote the adoption of soundness on 
corporate governance practices in the banking sector, named Basel II. The highlights of 
this attempt focus most on boards of directors, interest conflicts, transparency, and 
supervision.  
Despite the continuous efforts made by important regulators and researchers, the global 
financial crisis unfolded significant weaknesses regarding current corporate government 
standards. Transparency, more efficacious risk management, remuneration practices, 
and board structure, are some of the attributes that the majority of companies worldwide 
needed to re-examine and re-structure. We could continue this conversation, however, 
the above information is enough in order to understand the importance of good 
corporate governance practices. A thorough literature review follows, with some of the 
most important researches presented, regarding the connection or not of corporate 
governance to firm performance. 
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II. Literature Review 
A considerable empirical research has been conducted in order to derive evidence on 
whether firm performance is related to corporate governance. However, little research 
has been done regarding the impact of corporate governance on financial firms, 
especially during the last years, where banks are considered to be liable for the latest 
financial crisis. In this Section, several important researches and studies follow, in order 
to report the main streams that other authors have developed regarding corporate 
governance and the correlation or not with firm performance. 
Most of them use financial data in combination to corporate governance practices on 
their attempt to identify a possible interrelationship with firm performance ( Mehran 
1995, Demsetz and Lehn 1985). A method that is also followed in this research, where 
along with corporate governance variables, some financial ratios such as leverage, 
volatility, firm’s size, etc. are examined in their relationship with firm performance. 
Next follow a brief review of relevant studies and a critical evaluation of their main 
conclusions: 
La Porta et al. (1999) are trying to examine the relationship between firm value and 
corporate governance. Using a sample of 27 countries, they concluded that firms, which 
belong to countries with higher corporate governance standards, have higher valuation. 
In addition, they indicated that investors’ protection is usually associated with effective 
corporate governance, while the improvement of this protection and financial markets, 
depend on the legal structure of each country and in the origin of its law. 
Core et al. (1999) also tried to find if there is a connection between corporate 
governance and financial performance by creating a null hypothesis saying that board 
and ownership structure affect optimal CEO constructing and firm performance. Their 
sample consisted of 495 observations from 205 publicly traded U.S. firms for a 3 year 
period. They found that depending on board and ownership structure variables, CEO’s 
gain greater compensation when corporate governance structures are less effective. 
Generally, they concluded that weaker corporate governance structures create greater 
agency problems to firms, CEOs receive greater compensation and firm performance 
gets worse. 
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Another study that inquires into the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance is that of Klapper and Love (2002). Using corporate governance data from 
14 emerging markets, they connect poor corporate governance with countries with 
weaker legal systems. They also found that better corporate governance is correlated 
with better operating performance (ROA) and market valuation (Tobin’s Q).  
An additional study, that of Bauer et al (2003).examines companies’ quality of 
governance by using Deminor’s corporate governance ratings, covering almost 26 firms 
from across Europe for a period of one year (2000-2001). The sample is based on 300 
different criteria that can be summarized to four major categories: “Rights and Duties of 
Shareholders”, “Range of Takeover Defenses”, “Disclosure on Corporate Governance” 
and “Board Structure and Functioning”. They build portfolios consisting of well– and 
poorly – governed companies and compare their performance, while they also examine 
the impact of corporate governance on firm valuation. The results showed that these 
variables have a positive relationship with corporate governance. Moreover, they 
analyzed the correlation between corporate governance and firm performance by using 
Net Profit Margin (NPM) and Return on Equity (ROE), finding that these two variables 
have a negative relationship with corporate governance. 
Continuing the empirical research on corporate governance, Gompers et al. (2003) 
constructed a “Governance Index” named “G” with 24 governance rules in order to 
examine the level of shareholder rights at 1500 U.S. firms during the 1990’s. They 
found that firms with stronger shareholder rights are valued more, have higher profits 
and sales growth, and lower capital expenditures. They also applied 3 Hypothesis based 
on Governance provisions and found that weaker shareholders’ rights increase agency 
costs. In addition, they concluded that governance does not affect performance when 
governance provisions are protective for managers and finally, that when governance 
provisions are not selected randomly, they do not influence managerial power or agency 
costs. 
Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2003) using a sample of US commercial banks for 1995 
try also to identify a relationship between firm performance and corporate governance. 
They found that corporate governance, specifically agency costs, and ownership 
structure influence firm performance. In addition, they deduced that higher leverage and 
lower equity capital ratio have an impact on firm performance.    
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Leng (2004) wanted also to investigate the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance by using 77 randomly selected publicly listed companies in 
Malaysia. ROE and Dividend payout are the two dependent variables for measuring 
financial performance and (1) the proportion of non-executive directors on the board of 
director, (2) if the chairman of the audit committee is an executive or a non-executive 
director, (3) if the CEO of the company is also the chairman of the board of directors or 
not, (4) the proportion of large institutional investors owning shares in the company, (5) 
the total amount of debt owned by the company divided to total capital (GEAR), (6) the 
proportion of concentrated ownership of the firm, owned by a single person or few 
entities and finally, (7) the size of the company in terms of turnover, are the seven 
independent variables for corporate governance. His results showed that three variables 
(the proportion of large institutional investors, GEAR and the size of the company in 
terms of turnover) are significant for firm financial performance by influencing ROE. 
Another study is that of Brown and Caylor (2004), who created a summary metric 
(Gov-Score) in order to measure the strength of firm’s governance. They take a sample 
of 2327 firms starting as of 2003 and base their research on 51 corporate governance 
provisions, covering eight governance categories: audit, board of directors, charter 
/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, ownership, 
progressive practices and state of incorporation. They also take six performance 
measures: ROE, profit margin, sales growth, (regarding operating performance), 
Tobin’s Q (regarding valuation) and dividend yields share repurchases (regarding 
shareholders payout). Their results indicated that all of firm performance measures have 
a positive relation with Gov-Score except from sales growth, suggesting that firms, 
which are poorly-governed, are less profitable, less valuable and pay out less cash to 
their shareholders. They also concluded that as far as the eight governance categories 
are concerned, executive and director compensation are highly associated to good 
performance, while the charter/ bylaws category is the least highly associated. 
Sanda et al. (2005) attempted to address whether or not corporate governance influences 
firm performance with a sample of 93 firms from the Nigerian Stock Exchange for the 
period 1996-1999. PE ratio (Price-Earning), ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q are his 
dependent variables while directors shareholding, board size, number of outside 
directors on the board, ownership concentration, leverage, firm size, role of CEO, and if 
CEO is expatriate or not are the control variables. He inferred that board size and the 
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separation of the posts of CEO and Chairman are important for firm performance as 
well as if CEO is an expatriate. In contrast, the proportion of outside directors plays no 
role on firm performance. 
Kajola (2008) seeks to examine also this relationship for Nigerian listed firms between 
2000 and 2006. With a sample of 20 non-financial firms and board size, board 
composition, chief executive status and audit committee as corporate governance 
variables and ROE and Profit Margin as firm performance measures, he found that ROE 
has a positive relationship with board size and chief executive status, while the last one 
is also related to Profit Margin. 
Liargovas and Skandalis (2009) conducted a research on which financial determinants 
can affect firm performance. Using data from Greek industrial firms during the period 
1997-2004, they found that leverage affects significantly firm performance, while 
investments decisions and export activities also contribute to the overall performance of 
Greek firms. 
Peni and Vähämaa (2009) also wanted to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance of the banking industry. Using a sample of 62 large 
publicly traded US commercial banks and board size and composition as corporate 
governance variables, they found that banks with higher corporate governance had 
higher profitability during the year 2008, while they had negative effects on stock 
market valuations. 
Ertugrul and Hedge (2009) examined also the relationship of corporate governance and 
firm performance. With 4.546 observations available, for years 2003, 2004, 2005 and 
first six months of 2006, they researched corporate governance ratings by three premier 
US rating agencies and found that summary scores are poor predictors of firm 
performance, in contrast to sub-ratings, which provide more reliable results. 
Moreover, Cheffins (2009) used a sample of 37 firms that were removed from iconic 
S&P 500 index during 2008 in order to see if corporate governance practices failed 
during financial crisis. His overall outcome indicated that corporate governance didn’t 
affect firms’ performance significantly, however, some practices, such as institutional 
shareholders, boardroom practices and executive pay policies revealed problems.  
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Erkens et al.(2010) have also contributed to the empirical research by conducting an 
empirical analysis using data from 2007-2008 of 296 publicly listed financial firms 
from 30 countries in order to see if corporate governance influences firm performance. 
Using cumulative stock returns to measure firm performance and firms’ corporate 
boards and ownership structures to measure corporate governance, they found that firms 
with higher institutional ownership and more independent boards have worse stock 
returns during the crisis (2007-08). 
Van-Ness et al. (2010) examined also the relationship of corporate governance and firm 
performance for a sample of 200 U.S. companies for a period that covers 2006-2007. 
They took into account five dimensions of financial performance including: corporate 
growth, profitability and asset utilization, leverage, market confidence and liquidity, 
while examining corporate governance by using board composition and more 
specifically, duality, proportion of outside directors, gender/diversity, boards members 
average age, average board tenure, board size and occupational expertise. They 
concluded that boards with a greater number of outside directors have not an influence 
on performance. On the other hand, duality, occupational expertise, board size and 
board tenure are variables that are significantly linked to financial performance. 
Cheung et al. (2011) ran also an empirical research for Chinese companies, and tried to 
examine the relationship between changes in the quality of corporate governance 
practices and market valuation of firms for 168 large listed companies in Hong Kong 
for the years 2002, 2004 and 2005. They found that companies that try to improve their 
corporate governance practices can increase substantially their market valuation. 
Khatab et al. (2011) tried also to investigate the connection between corporate 
governance and firm performance using ROA and ROE to measure financial 
performance. Based on a sample of 20 listed companies at Karachi Stock Exchange for 
the period 2005-2009, they concluded that firms with good corporate governance 
perform better than those with poor corporate governance mechanisms and also that 
leverage is positively associated with firm performance. 
Another empirical study that is considered to be part of the literature that focused on the 
above relationship is that of Abbas (2011), who focused on Pakistani banks. Taking a 
sample of 21 Pakistani banks for a period that covers 2006-2009, Abbas found that 
banks’ size and board of directors’ size have an effect on financial performance, and 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANK PERFORMANCE 2011 
 
18 
 
that the number of meetings of board of directors has a negative correlation with 
financial performance. 
An additional contribution is that of Lamport et al. (2011). They conducted a cross 
sectional research for 100 companies in Mauritius in 2009 in order to see if there is a 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Using 13 variables 
which they classified into 9 categories (board effectiveness, communication and 
disclosure, integrated sustainability reporting, audit quality, company secretary, board 
committee, remuneration, nomination and CEO duality), and by implementing the Z-
score from Taffler model in order to measure performance, they found that there is no 
significant relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
Last on the list of this literature review is the study of Sakawa and Watanabel (2011), 
which used 84 Japanese companies from the banking industry during the period 2006-
2009 in order to examine the relationship of firm performance and corporate 
governance. Their results indicated that firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) has 
a negative relationship with board size while no connection to outside directors. They 
also concluded that firm’s size is also related to firm performance as the last is affected 
positively by size.  
Generally, previous researches don’t conclude in one outcome, the main stream of the 
majority of them indicates, that higher corporate governance standards have a positive 
effect on firm performance (Core et al., 1999, Brown and Caylor, 2004, Peni and 
Vähämää, 2009, Cheung et al., 2011), while some others also nominate that good 
corporate governance structures are related to the countries’ legal systems (La Porta et 
al., 1999, Klapper and Love, 2002). In addition, when it comes to specific factors of 
corporate governance that may influence firm performance; it is obvious that a large 
number of researchers predicate that board size is highly associated to firm performance 
(Sand et al., 2005, Kajola, 2008, Van-Ness et al., 2010, Abbas, 2011, Sakawa and 
Watanabel, 2011). However, not a single conclusion can be made on whether or not 
corporate governance mechanisms affect firm performance in general, as the biggest 
part of the literature review highlights separate aspects of corporate governance. Other 
than that, leverage (Liargovas and Skandalis, 2009, Khatab et al., 2011) and firm size 
(Leng, 2004, Abbas, 2011, Sakawa and Watanabel, 2011) are two variables that are 
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highly examined in respect to their effect on firm performance and seem to have a 
relationship with it. 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE are the main variables 
used to measure firm performance(Leng, 2004, Brown and Caylor, 2004, Sand et al., 
2005, Kajola, 2008, Khatab et al., 2011, Sakawa and Watanabel, 2011), with the first 
variable presenting a strong relationship with corporate governance.  
 
The following research tries to identify a possible relationship between bank 
performance and corporate governance by using two regression models for each of the 
dependent variables, including in the first only CGQ Industry rating and in the second 
only the separated subscores of them regarding corporate governance variables. Only 
one relative research method was found that of Ertugrul and Hedge (2009), who found 
the opposite results than that of this study. The rest of the variables are financial ratios 
that are used extensively on relevant researches, like ROA (Klapper and Love, 2002), 
ROE (Bauer et al., 2003, Leng, 2004, Brown and Caylor, 2004)) P/E (Sanda et al., 
2005), Investment Return and Tobin’s Q (Klapper and Love, 2002, Sand et al, 2005, 
Sakawa and Watanabel, 2011). 
 
Implementing this research, the conclusion expected due to the relevant background, is 
that corporate governance should effect to some extent bank performance, as better 
corporate governance practices should lead to a healthier and more stable economic 
environment.   
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III. Data and Methodology 
 
Data collection 
The sample used in this model, consists of listed U.S. commercial banks in a period of 7 
years, starting in 2003 until 2009. The period is of high importance, as during these 
years significant changes occurred, both in the way financial institutions were managed 
and regulated, with the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act being one of the main 
restructurings of the banking regulatory system, regarding U.S. In addition, the 2003-
2009 period includes the years the recession struck the U.S. as well as its expansion to 
the rest of the world, capturing in that way the influence that the economic meltdown 
had in the performance of banks. The number of banks used in the current research is 
169, excluding banks that had limited information regarding corporate governance or 
accounting data, resulting in 1183 observations. Corporate governance information was 
extracted from the RiskMetrics Group Inc., while accounting information were gathered 
from Thomson ONE Banker database. 
 
Corporate governance measurement 
Public disclosure documents, press releases and corporate governance websites are the 
sources of corporate governance data, which are then reviewed by ISS’ corporate 
governance analysts. For US companies, which is the area of this research, data were 
gathered on 63 different items regarding: 1. Board of directors, 2. Audit, 3. 
Antitakeover, and 4. Compensation/ownership. CGQ-index and CGQ-industry are the 
two ranks for the measurements of corporate governance effectiveness, there is also 
CGQ subscores that provide company’s governance measurements in four particular 
areas: board, takeover defense, executive and director compensation and ownership, and 
audit. Several researches used CGQ Metrics in order to measure corporate governance 
effectiveness such as Brown and Caylor (2004), Ertugrul and Hedge (2009). 
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Firm performance measurement 
In order to see if there is a relationship between corporate governance and bank 
performance, accounting data were extracted from Thomson One Banker, using five 
measurements, ROA, ROE, P/E, Investment Return, and Tobin’s Q for firm 
performance. The first variable we use in order to determine firm performance is ROA 
(return on assets). ROA is an important indicator of how profitable the companies’ 
assets are in generating revenue. This ratio has been used widely from researchers that 
wanted to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
such as Sanda et al.(2005), and Khatab et al., (2011). ROE (return on equity), which is 
also used often as a measurement of firm performance ( Bauer et al., 2003, Leng, 2004, 
Brown and Caylor, 2004, Sanda et al., 2004, Kajola, 2008, Khatab et al., 2011)  it 
measures company profitability in regard to money shareholders invested. P/E (price-
earnings) ratio is the third variable being examined and compares the earnings per share 
with the amount that has been invested on it. P/E ratio reflects the market’s confidence 
in future prospects of the company (Weetman, 2011). Another indicator of firm 
performance is Investment Return ratio which is a valuable indicator especially for 
investors helping them to see if their investments were fruitful. The last variable is 
Tobin’s Q, which has been used on several prior studies (Klapper and Love, 2002, 
Brown and Caylor, 2004, Sanda et al., 2005, Sakawa and Watanabel, 2011) and 
measures the market value of a firm regarding its assets. 
 
Table 1: Dependent Variables 
 
Variables Description 
ROA Net Income before Preferred 
Dividends+((Interest Expense on Debt-
Interest Capitalized)*(1-Tax Rate)) / Last 
Year’s Total Assets 
ROE Income Before Dividends-Preferred 
Dividends) / Total Common Equity 
P/E Current Price / Earnings 
Investment Return Market price Year End + Dividends per 
Share + Special Dividend-Quarter 1 + 
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Special Dividend-Quarter 2 + Special 
Dividend Quarter 3 +Special Dividend 
Quarter 4) / Last Year’s Market price-Year 
End)*100 
Tobin’s Q Market Value / Total Assets 
 
As it is already mentioned corporate governance effectiveness is measured using CGQ 
rating. In this research we take into account CGQ-Industry, while we run our model 
once more using this time the five subscores of corporate governance effectiveness 
(board, takeover defense, executive and director compensation and ownership, and 
audit), so as to see if there is one or more of these factors that may affect firm 
performance more than the others. Along with corporate governance variables we 
examine also some data that are valuable for banks. More specifically, we take into 
account size by using total assets of banks,  capital risk, credit risk, which is measured 
by several kinds of loans such as non performing loans to total loans, net loan losses to 
total loans, consumer and installment loans to total loans and commercial and industrial 
loans to total loans. We also measure leverage by using total debt to total assets, 
solvency is controlled by total assets to total liabilities and last we control volatility 
using stock’s price. 
 
Table 2. Independent Variables 
 
Variables Definition 
CGQ Industry Corporate Governance Rating 
board board subscores-industry 
takeover takeover defense subscores-industry 
compensation compensation subscores-industry 
audit audit subscores-industry 
capital _risk Capital Adequacy Ratio- Tier 1 
size Natural logarithm of total assets 
credit _risk1 Non Performing Loans / Total Loans 
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credit _risk2 Net Loan Losses / Total Loans 
credit _risk3 Consumer & Installment Loans / Total 
Loans 
credit _risk4 Commercial $ Industrial Loans / Total 
Loans 
leverage Total Debt / Total Assets 
solvency Total Assets / Total Liabilities 
volatility Std. Deviation of stock returns 
Y2003 A dummy variable with value of 1 if 
observations are in year 2003 and 0 
otherwise 
Y2004 A dummy variable with value of 1 if 
observations are in year 2004 and 0 
otherwise 
Y2005 A dummy variable with value of 1 if 
observations are in year 2005 and 0 
otherwise 
Y2007 A dummy variable with value of 1 if 
observations are in year 2006 and 0 
otherwise 
Y2008 A dummy variable with value of 1 if 
observations are in year 2007 and 0 
otherwise 
Y2009 A dummy variable with value of 1 if 
observations are in year 2009 and 0 
otherwise 
e Error term 
 
These independent variables that we use in our model are of importance to banks, as 
financial institutions have a different way of measuring their performance due to their 
special accounting data. That is one of the reasons that we had to limit our research on 
financial institutions only, as other companies of the same sector, such as insurances or 
other diversified financials do not have the same way of measurement, regarding their 
ratio construction. 
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Using an Ordinary Least Squared Model, we are going to exam if a relationship exceeds 
between corporate governance and bank performance, with the difference of running the 
model twice for each dependent variable, using first CGQ-industry rating for corporate 
governance effectiveness and second CGQ subscores industry, for periods 2003-2009 
and 2007-2009, respectively. 
 
Firm Performance = β0 + β1CGQ + β2size + β3cpt_r + β4nprf_tl + β5nll_tl + β6cns_tl + 
β7cmm_tl + β8leverage + β9solvency + β10volatility + β11Y2003 + β12Y2004 + β13Y2005 
+ β14Y2007 + β15Y2008 + β162009 + e 
 
Firm Performance = β0 + β1brd_in + β2tkd_in + β3cmp_in + β4ad_in + β5size + β6cpt_r 
+ β7nprf_tl + β8nll_tl + β9cns_tl + β10cmm_tl + β11leverage + β12solvency + β13volatility 
+ β14Y2003 + β15Y2004 + β16Y2005 + β17Y2007 + β18Y2008 + β19Y2009 + e 
 
Firm Performance = β0 + β1CGQ + β2size + β3cpt_r + β4nprf_tl + β5nll_tl + β6cns_tl + 
β7cmm_tl + β8leverage + β9solvency + β10volatility + β11Y2008 + β122009 + e 
 
Firm Performance = β0 + β1brd_in + β2tkd_in + β3cmp_in + β4ad_in + β5size + β6cpt_r 
+ β7nprf_tl + β8nll_tl + β9cns_tl + β10cmm_tl + β11leverage + β12solvency + β13volatility  
+ β14Y2008 + β15Y2009 + e 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
ROA 1182 -5,80 3,95 1,15 0,94 
ROE 1182 -4883,76 38,85 3,38 143,41 
P/E 1182 2,00 1037,00 20,90 39,30 
Inv _return 1182 -94,31 245,50 2,93 32,87 
Tobin's Q 1182 -0,68 0,28 -0,03 0,10 
CGQ 1182 0,20 100,00 56,21 27,90 
board 1182 0,00 5,00 3,26 1,39 
compensation 1182 0,00 5,00 3,36 1,39 
takeover 1182 0,00 5,00 3,06 1,44 
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audit 1182 0,00 5,00 3,35 1,44 
size 1182 4,98 14,07 7,47 1,54 
capital _risk 1182 0,03 38,40 11,75 3,13 
credit _risk1 1182 0,00 0,26 0,01 0,02 
credit _risk2 1182 -0,01 0,06 0,00 0,01 
credit _risk3 1182 0,00 0,52 0,11 0,98 
credit _risk4 1182 0,00 0,87 0,22 0,17 
leverage 1182 0,00 0,67 0,16 0,09 
solvency 1182 1,00 1,67 1,10 0,04 
volatility 1182 10,16 61,11 20,88 5,54 
 
 
The above table presents the descriptive statistics of both dependent and independent 
variables that we are going to use in this model. It contains the number of observations, 
minimums, maximums, Means and standard deviation of the variables. Interpreting the 
table we can see that banks in this seven year period did not perform well with an 
average ROA of almost 1%, meaning that banks didn’t utilize effectively their assets to 
generate profit. Similar results we see also on ROE with a Mean of about 3%, connoting 
small profits in comparison to the total amount shareholders invested. Continuing with 
descriptive statistics, the Mean of P/E ratio, almost 21%, shows relative good earnings, 
meaning that the market believes in the prospects of banks. However, this ratio should 
better be compared among firms that belong to the same industry and not to the whole 
industry, in this case financial industry, because the purpose of the price-earnings ratio 
is to see how a company performs in relation to another company of the same sector. 
Investment Return Mean of almost 3% also means that returns on investments of banks 
are more than their costs, however, this doesn’t mean that shareholders and other 
interested parts in banks investments can be sure of the risk that these decisions have. 
Tobin’s Q on the other hand, with a Mean close to 0 indicates that banks’ cost of 
replacing their assets is generally greater than the value of their stock. Meaning that 
their stocks are undervalued. This ratio is very crucial when it comes to investments and 
is widely used for this kind of decisions. The next variable under examination on the 
table is CGQ-industry rating, its Mean of 56 in relation to its minimum and maximum 
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score, indicates a moderate performance of banks regarding their corporate governance 
practices, suggesting that there is a lot of space for improvement. More specifically, if 
we take a look on the Means of CGQ subscores, we can see that all of them are around 
3, with the highest score of 3,3553 on compensation and the lowest on takeover 
defenses with a Mean of 3,0601. As the Maximum on all of the sub-scores corporate 
governance rating is 5, companies could try to increase their averages in an attempt of 
improving their general picture, regarding corporate governance. Next on the table is the 
size of banks, which has been calculated according to the assets of them, and their 
natural logarithm. As we can see the average size of the banks that are included on the 
research are of medium size with a Mean of almost 7,5 and a minimum and maximum 
of 4,98 and 14,07, respectively. Regarding capital risk on banks, it seems that banks do 
not have extreme chances of losses that would affect financial institutions’ capital base, 
while regarding credit risk, which especially for banks is measured based on several 
loans, the first two indicators of credit risk, non performing loans to total loans and net 
loan losses to total loans, seem to be very low, but consumer & installment loans to total 
loans and commercial & industrial loans to total loans indicate that a relatively high 
proportion of borrowers is not able to repay both principal and interest. This is in 
accordance to one of the main reasons of the US financial crisis, as thousands of people 
couldn’t meet their obligations to banks. Moving on, seems that most of banks have 
financed their assets based on debt rather than equity, while they seem to respond well 
to their obligations. Finally, it seems there is a fluctuation in securities’ values, 
however, there are no changes that spread out over a large range of values. 
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Correlation Matrix 
The table below introduces the correlation of the variables used in the model. Based on 
theory, correlation is measured on a scale equal to 1 when there is a perfect positive 
correlation meaning that if one variable is increasing then the other is also increasing, 
equals to -1 when there is a perfect negative correlation with one variable increasing and 
the other decreasing, and zero when there is no correlation between them. According to 
our correlation matrix, our dependent variables, ROA, ROE, P/E and Tobin’s Q do not 
seem to have a very strong correlation with the independent variables. More 
specifically, while ROA presents a negative correlation with volatility (-0,324), and two 
of the credit risk indicators, credit _risk1 (-0,591) and credit _risk2 (-0,608), no other 
connection seems to be appreciable enough. The same happens with the next dependent 
variable ROE, as none of the independent variables are strong correlated to it. 
Interesting is P/E variable which shows no important relationship with any of the 
independent variables, and especially with corporate governance, which is our primary 
variable under investigation. On the other hand, Investment Return shows a relatively 
stronger negative relationship with non performing loans and net loan losses (credit risk 
1 & 2) compared to P/E variable, but once more its correlation to corporate governance 
is negligible. Finally, Tobin’s Q seems to have the higher positive relationship with 
CGQ, although it is nonessential (0,009). It is also has a stronger negative correlation 
leverage (-0,59), and with almost all predictors of credit risk apart from commercial and 
industrial loans to total loans (credit _risk4). However, regression analysis is needed, in 
order to inquire into the possible relationship between firm performance and the 
independent variables of the model. The next part presents the models for every 
dependent variable, examined both for CGQ-Industry and corporate governance sub-
scores, separately, for the periods 2003-2009 and 2007-2009, respectively.  
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 ROA ROE P/E Inv_ 
Retur
n 
Tobin
's Q 
CGQ board comp
ensat
ion 
takeo
ver 
audit size lever
age 
solve
ncy 
volati
lity 
Capit
al 
_risk 
cred_
risk1 
cred_
risk2 
cred_
risk3 
cred_
risk4 
ROA 1,00
0 
                    
ROE 0,24
4** 
1,00
0 
                 
P/E -
0,19
3 
-
0,00
8 
1,00
0 
                
Inv 
_retu
rn 
0,47
9** 
0,13
0** 
-
0,02
8 
1,00
0 
               
Tobin
's Q 
0,30
8** 
0,04
1 
-
0,02
6 
0,37
5** 
1,00
0 
              
CGQ 0,04
1 
0,02
5 
0,01
0 
-
0,03
3 
0,09
8** 
1,00
0 
             
board 0,01
9 
0,00
5 
0,01
4 
-
0,03
0 
0,06
4* 
0,82
1** 
1,00
0 
            
comp
ensat
ion 
0,01
2 
0,02
7 
0,00
6 
-
0,04
5 
-
0,01
2 
0,42
4** 
0,19
5** 
1,00
0 
           
takeo
ver 
0,00
6 
0,02
5 
0,00
1 
 
0,02
9 
0,10
5** 
0,22
0** 
0,08
7** 
-
0,01
7 
1,00
0 
          
audit -
0,00
5 
0,04
5 
0,04
6 
-
0,01
1 
-
0,02
4 
0,43
3** 
0,35
8* 
0,10
5** 
-
0,01
1 
1,00
0 
         
size 0,06
2* 
0,01
3 
-
0,03
3 
-
0,07
3* 
0,01
4 
0,44
9** 
0,41
4** 
0,27
8** 
-
0,06
6* 
0,18
3** 
1,00
0 
        
lever
age 
0,16
6** 
0,03
7 
-
0,07
3* 
-
0,04
5 
-
0,59
0 
0,06
4* 
0,07
5** 
0,07
7** 
-
0,12
5** 
0,04
1 
0,24
0** 
1,00
0 
       
solve
ncy 
0,11
4** 
0,09
3** 
0,11
5* 
 
0,04
8 
0,15
4** 
0,09
3** 
0,05
8* 
0,07
9** 
0,07
2* 
0,04
7 
0,06
3* 
-
0,22
3 
1,00
0 
      
Volati
lity 
-
0,32
4** 
-
0,16
3** 
0,04
3 
-
0,03
1 
-
0,17
4** 
0,03
7 
0,09
9** 
-
0,06
3* 
0,04
7 
0,,04
7 
0,08
6** 
0,09
1** 
-
0,06
5* 
1,00
0 
     
Capit
al 
_risk 
0,11
4** 
0,12
0** 
0,07
8** 
0,09
5** 
0,06
4 
-
0,06
3* 
-
0,05
5 
-
0,05
4 
0,07
5** 
-
0,05
0 
-
0,29
6** 
-
0,01
1 
0,49
1** 
-
0,03
3 
1,00
0 
    
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANK PERFORMANCE 2011 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Con
t’d 
ROA ROE P/E Inv_ 
Retur
n 
Tobin
's Q 
CGQ board comp
ensati
on 
takeo
ver 
audit size lever
age 
solve
ncy 
volati
lity 
Capit
al 
_risk 
cred_
risk1 
cred_
risk2 
cred_
risk3 
cred_
risk4 
credit
_risk
1 
-
0,59
1** 
-
0,23
6** 
0,07
6** 
-
0,33
9** 
-
0,27
5** 
-
0,00
4** 
-
0,00
3** 
-
0,03
1 
0,02
2 
0,01
0 
0,00
1 
-
0,04
9 
-
0,08
8** 
0,34
9** 
-
0,04
6 
1,00
0 
   
credit
_risk
2 
-
0,60
8** 
-
0,17
2** 
0,21
8** 
-
0,29
4** 
-
0,21
4** 
0,11
5** 
0,11
3** 
0,05
9* 
0,03
4 
0,03
3 
0,17
8** 
-
0,06
6* 
0,00
8 
0,35
7** 
-
0,01
0 
0,56
0** 
1,00
0 
  
credit
_risk
3 
0,11
9** 
0,03
8 
-
0,04
9 
0,06
6* 
0,04
3 
0,16
5 
0,16
8** 
0,07
5** 
-
0,03
6 
0,05
3 
0,26
1** 
0,08
5** 
-
0,05
8* 
-
0,10
3** 
-
0,08
3** 
-
0,08
8** 
0,03
4 
1,00
0 
 
credit
_risk
4 
0,032 0,037 -
0,029 
0,032 0,207
** 
0,153 0,129
** 
0,046 0,101
** 
-
0,011 
0,178
** 
-
0,179
** 
0,060
* 
-
0,057 
-
0,129
** 
-
0,029 
0,000 0,153
** 
1,000 
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IV. Data Analysis and Discussion 
In order to see if there is a relationship between firm performance and corporate 
governance, five variables are examined, measuring firm performance: ROA, ROE, P/E, 
Investment Return, and Tobin’s Q. For each of these variables two regression models 
are going to be run, so as to see if corporate governance affects bank performance. First, 
CGQ is going to be the independent variable, which wants to see if it affects dependent 
variables. Second, corporate governance subscores: board, takeover defense, executive 
and director compensation and ownership, and audit will be the independent variables 
that are going to be tested on their possible impact on firm performance. Tables that 
follow present the statistical analysis of the equations and the Hypothesis we are 
examining, first for the years 2003-2009 and then for 2007-2009: 
H0 = CGQ does not affect firm performance (ROA, ROE, P/E, Inv _return, Tobin’s Q) 
H1 = CGQ affects firm performance (ROA, ROE, P/E, Inv _return, Tobin’s Q) 
 
 
Table 5: Regression Analysis of firm performance regarding CGQ for 2003-2009: 
  
Variables            ROA         ROE              P/E         Inv _return    Tobin’s Q 
 t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
VIF 
(Constant) -1,780 
(0,075) 
-0,757 
(0,449) 
-2,345 
(0,019) 
0,012 
(0,991) 
3,925 
(0,000) 
 
CGQ 0,762 
(0,446) 
0,388 
(0,698) 
0,384 
(0,701) 
-0,886 
(0,376) 
3,025 
(0,003) 
1,281 
size 5,176 
(0,000) 
1,190 
(0,234) 
-1,940 
(0,053) 
0,845 
(0,398) 
10,720 
(0,000) 
1,783 
leverage 5,531 
(0,000) 
0,905 
(0,366) 
-0,422 
(0,673) 
-2,119 
(0,034) 
-32,959 
(0,000) 
1,313 
solvency 2,403 
(0,016) 
0,380 
(0,704) 
3,082 
(0,002) 
0,030 
(0,976) 
-4,986 
(0,000) 
1,625 
volatility -3,349 
(0,001) 
-2,795 
(0,005) 
-0,667 
(0,505) 
2,452 
(0,014) 
-0,023 
(0,982) 
1,308 
capital _risk 4,087 
(0,000) 
3,357 
(0,001) 
-0,153 
(0,878) 
1,279 
(0,201) 
7,620 
(0,000) 
1,692 
credit _risk1 -9,298 
(0,000) 
-4,694 
(0,000) 
-1,237 
(0,216) 
-6,206 
(0,000) 
-3,442 
(0,001) 
1,729 
credit _risk2 -15,495 
(0,000) 
-1,550 
(0,121) 
7,651 
(0,000) 
-6,535 
(0,000) 
-5,255 
(0,000) 
1,769 
credit _risk3 2,523 1,970 -1,346 1,294 -0,103 1,140 
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(0,012) (0,844) (0,179) (0,196) (0,918) 
credit _risk4 0,735 
(0,463) 
1,210 
(0,227) 
-0,809 
(0,419) 
0,774 
(0,439) 
2,726 
(0,007) 
1,128 
Y2003 2,147 
(0,032) 
0,692 
(0,489) 
-0,350 
(0,727) 
13,298 
(0,000) 
2,615 
(0,009) 
1,829 
Y2004 -0,349 
(0,727) 
0,272 
(0,786) 
0,293 
(0,770) 
1,597 
(0,111) 
3,293 
(0,001) 
1,765 
Y2005 0,169 
(0,866) 
0,142 
(0,887) 
0,180 
(0,857) 
-4,732 
(0,000) 
0,633 
(0,572) 
1,726 
Y2007 -2,010 
(0,045) 
0,480 
(0,631) 
-0,670 
(0,503) 
-11,926 
(0,000) 
-5,209 
(0,000) 
1,728 
Y2008 -7,592 
(0,000) 
1,271 
(0,204) 
-1,044 
(0,297) 
-10,062 
(0,000) 
-9,513 
(0,000) 
1,817 
Y2009 -3,749 
(0,000) 
0,452 
(0,651) 
-1,128 
(0,260) 
-2,845 
(0,005) 
-8,981 
(0,000) 
2,152 
 
 ROA ROE P/E Inv _return Tobin’s Q 
Adjusted R-square 0,555 0,071 0,062 0,510 0,615 
F- value 93,023 6,652 5,889 77,848 118,980 
 
where, 
CGQ = Industry corporate governance rating, 
size = natural logarithm of Total Assets, 
leverage = Total Debt / Total Assets, 
solvency = Total Assets / Total Liabilities, 
volatility = Std. Deviation of stock returns, 
capital _risk = Capital Adequacy Ratio – Tier 1, 
credit _risk 1 = Non performing loans / Total loans, 
credit _risk2 = Net loan losses / Total loans, 
credit _risk3 = Consumer & Installment loans /Total loans, 
credit _risk4 = Commercial & Industrial loans /Total loans, 
Y2003=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2003 and 0 otherwise, 
Y2004=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2004 and 0 otherwise, 
Y2005=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2005 and 0 otherwise, 
Y2007=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2007 and 0 otherwise, 
Y2008=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2008 and 0 otherwise, 
Y2009=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
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Regression Analysis helps us understand how the value of one variable (dependent) 
changes when one of the independent variables changes, while the others remain fixed. 
In this research, first is examined the value of ROA regarding the independent variables 
that were presented and explained earlier, with CGQ being the variable which will 
reveal to us its possible impact on ROA. Adjusted R-square shows the relative 
predictive power of the model we use. Adjusted R-square for ROA is 0,555, thus, we 
can say that almost 56% of the dependent variable is explained from the controlled 
variables, which indicates a successful regression model. More specifically, table 5 
shows that CGQ rating along with credit_risk4, Y2004, and Y2005 have a relative low 
t-value, indicating no impact of these variables on ROA, especially for CGQ, t-value 
equals to 0,762. In addition, the confidence interval of the model is 5%, while the above 
variables have Sig values that exceed 0,05. This means that CGQ, credit_risk4, Y2004, 
and Y2005 cannot reject the Null Hypothesis. In contrast, the rest of the variables and 
especially size, leverage, volatility, capital _risk, credit_risk1, credit_risk2, , and the last 
two years of the examined period have a great impact on ROA, with Sig values ≤ 0,05 
leading to the rejection of Null Hypothesis.   
In contrast to ROA Regression Analysis Model, the predictive power of ROE Model is 
not strong enough, with Adjusted R-square of 0,071. This means that only 7% of the 
dependent variable can be explained by the control variables. Here also, CGQ, which is 
the main variable under investigation, doesn’t have an impact on ROE with t-value = 
0,388 and Sig. value = 0,698, keeping the same confidence interval of 5%.  Thus, Null 
Hypothesis cannot be rejected by CGQ and the majority of control variables. 
Nevertheless, there are volatility, capital _risk, and credit_risk1, that have a strong 
impact on ROE, with Sig. values of no more than 0,005, but once more CGQ, which is 
the variable that concerns us more, isn’t included in them. We should however keep in 
mind that results are not a good indicator, as Adjusted R-square is very low.  
Like on ROE regression model, Adjusted R-square for P/E , is also very low, with only 
6,2% of the dependent variable being explained by the control variables, this model, 
like the previous does not have strong predictive power. Likewise, CGQ doesn’t have 
an impact on P/E with t = 0,384, and Sig. value = 0,701, followed by the rest of the 
variables.  Only two of them, solvency and credit_risk1 have strong relationship to P/E 
with the first having t = 7,651, a relatively high value, and Sig. value = 0, and the 
second with t = 3,082 and Sig. value = 0,002, keeping p-value of 0,05. Although these 
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two variables seem to have a strong impact on P/E, the variable that is under 
examination, CGQ doesn’t exhibit any effect on firm performance, thus, it cannot reject 
Null Hypothesis. It is important to mention, that the two previous examined variables, 
ROE and P/E, which unveiled not an important relation to the control variables, have 
actually a low predictive power.  
Continuing with the regression analysis, this time with Investment Return as the 
variable that measures firm performance, we see that the Adjusted R-square of this 
model equals to 0,510, showing that almost half of the sample of the dependent 
variable, 51% can be explained by the independent variables. CGQ also here seems not 
to have an impact on firm performance, as t-value equals to 0,886, in absolute value and 
Sig.-value that equals to 0,376, which exceeds p-value of 0,05. Once more, CGQ cannot 
reject Null Hypothesis, meaning that it doesn’t have an impact on Investment Return. 
However, leverage, volatility, credit_risk1, credit_risk2, and all the examined years 
except for 2004 have relatively high t-values and very small p-values that do not exceed 
0,05. These variables have a strong impact on Investment Return, so they can reject 
Null Hypothesis. Nevertheless, once more, corporate governance doesn’t seem to have 
an impact on firm performance. 
The last dependent variable under investigation is Tobin’s Q. This model, which 
according to Adjusted R-square of 0,615, has a quite strong predictive power as 61%  of 
the sample is explained by the control variables, shows that CGQ has an impact on 
Tobin’s Q, with t = 3,025 and Sig. value = 0,003 much lower than that of confidence 
interval of 0,05. The same happens to the majority of the control variables with most of 
them having very high t-values and quit low Sig. values, such as size (Sig. = 0), 
leverage (Sig. = 0), solvency (Sig. = 0), capital _risk (Sig.=0), credit _risk1 (Sig.= 
0,001), credit _risk2 (Sig.=0), Y2008 (Sig. = 0) and Y2009 (Sig. = 0). Therefore, most 
of the independent variables have an effect on Tobin’s Q, rejecting in that way Null 
Hypothesis. Exceptions are credit_risk3 and volatility which have very high Sig. values 
that exceed confidence interval. Noteworthy is that Tobin’s Q seems to be the only 
factor of firm performance that is affected by corporate governance within a model that 
represents 61% of the sample. More specifically, it seems that CGQ increases the value 
of Tobin’s Q ,  in contrast to the years 2007, 2008, and 2009 during which Tobin’s Q is 
continuously decreasing . This is not surprising, as these years are the most crucial of 
the recession period, and a decline on firm performance was expected to occur. The 
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model should also be checked for Multicollinearity. Results show no concerning signs, 
as VIF is much lower than 10. 
Next on the research is Regression Analysis with independent variables of corporate 
governance, the subscores of the industry for board, takeover defense, executive and 
director compensation and ownership, and audit. The method that is followed here is the 
same as the previous, including all the other independent variables. 
Table 6: Regression Analysis of firm performance regarding corporate governance sub-
scores for 2003-2009:  
H0 = corporate governance subscores do not affect firm performance (ROA, ROE, P/E, 
Inv _return, Tobin’s Q) 
H1 = corporate governance subscores affect firm performance (ROA, ROE, P/E, Inv 
_return, Tobin’s Q) 
 
Variables                ROA           ROE            P/E        Inv _return   Tobin’s Q 
 t  
(Sig.) 
t  
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
VIF 
(Constant) -1,888 
(0,059) 
-0,798 
(0,425) 
-2,318 
(0,021) 
0,014 
(0,989) 
3,755 
(0,000) 
 
board -0,155 
(0,887) 
-0,780 
(0,436) 
0,085 
(0,932) 
-0,662 
(0,508) 
1,601 
(0,110) 
1,418 
compensation -0,557 
(0,557) 
0,157 
(0,875) 
0,070 
(0,944) 
-0,233 
(0,8160 
0,435 
(0,663) 
1,124 
takeover 1,821 
(0,069) 
1,154 
(0,249) 
-0,761 
(0,447) 
0,629 
(0,529) 
1,140 
(0,255) 
1,053 
audit -0,442 
(0,659) 
1,779 
(0,076) 
1,708 
(0,088) 
-0,478 
(0,633) 
-1,494 
(0,136) 
1,177 
size 5,742 
(0,000) 
1,364 
(0,173) 
-2,112 
(0,035) 
0,887 
(0,375) 
11,377 
(0,000) 
1,796 
leverage 5,653 
(0,000) 
0,976 
(0,329) 
-0,477 
(0,633) 
-2,044 
(0,041) 
-32,709 
(0,000) 
1,325 
solvency 2,435 
(0,015) 
0,271 
(0,786) 
3,012 
(0,003) 
0,032 
(0,974) 
-4,857 
(0,000) 
1,635 
volatility -3,452 
(0,001) 
-2,793 
(0,005) 
-0,655 
(0,513) 
2,429 
(0,015) 
-0,144 
(0,885) 
1,338 
capital _risk 4,016 
(0,000) 
3,416 
(0,001) 
-0,056 
(0,956) 
1,225 
(0,221) 
7,542 
(0,000) 
1,704 
credit _risk1 -9,328 
(0,000) 
-4,717 
(0,000) 
-1,241 
(0,215) 
-6,208 
(0,000) 
-3,403 
(0,001) 
1,732 
credit _risk2 -15,482 
(0,000) 
-1,509 
(0,131) 
7,706 
(0,000) 
-6,550 
(0,000) 
-5,240 
(0,000) 
1,773 
credit _risk3 2,608 0,261 -1,382 1,318 0,024 1,144 
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(0,009) (0,794) (0,167) (0,188) (0,981) 
credit _risk4 0,584 
(0,559) 
1,262 
(0,207) 
-0,609 
(0,543) 
0,655 
(0,513) 
2,622 
(0,009) 
1,142 
Y2003 2,179 
(0,030) 
0,555 
(0,579) 
-0,469 
(0,639) 
13,237 
(0,000) 
2,793 
(0,005) 
1,844 
Y2004 -0,321 
(0,748) 
0,235 
(0,814) 
0,251 
(0,801) 
1,592 
(0,112) 
3,387 
(0,001) 
1,765 
Y2005 0,177 
(0,860) 
0,166 
(0,868) 
0,195 
(0,846) 
-4,735 
(0,000) 
0,644 
(0,520) 
1,727 
Y2007 -2,007 
(0,045) 
0,399 
(0,690) 
-0,739 
(0,460) 
-11,888 
(0,000) 
-5,091 
(0,000) 
1,734 
Y2008 -7,467 
(0,000) 
1,180 
(0,238) 
-1,150 
(0,250) 
-9,980 
(0,000) 
-9,306 
(0,000) 
1,831 
Y2009 -3,655 
(0,000) 
0,405 
(0,685) 
-1,190 
(0,234) 
-2,808 
(0,005) 
-8,847 
(0,000) 
2,176 
 
 ROA ROE P/E Inv _return Tobin’s Q 
Adjusted R-square 0,555 0,072 0,063 0,509 0,613 
F- value 78,535 5,832 5,164 65,454 99,459 
 
where, 
board = sub-score of board corporate governance rating, 
compensation = sub-score of executive and director compensation and ownership 
corporate governance rating, 
takeover = sub-score of takeover defenses  corporate governance rating, 
audit = sub-score of audit corporate governance rating, 
 size = natural logarithm of Total Assets, 
leverage = Total Debt / Total Assets, 
solvency = Total Assets / Total Liabilities, 
volatility = Std. Deviation of stock returns, 
capital _risk = Capital Adequacy Ratio – Tier 1, 
credit _risk 1 = Non performing loans / Total loans, 
credit _risk2 = Net loan losses / Total loans, 
credit _risk3 = Consumer & Installment loans /Total loans, 
credit _risk4 = Commercial & Industrial loans /Total loans, 
Y2003=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2003 and 0 otherwise, 
Y2004=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2004 and 0 otherwise, 
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Y2005=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2005 and 0 otherwise, 
Y2007=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2007 and 0 otherwise, 
Y2008=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2008 and 0 otherwise, 
Y2009=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
This time ROA is examined on whether it is affected by separated corporate governance 
practices, including board, takeover defenses, executive and director compensation and 
ownership, and finally, audit. The model has a good predictive power for the first 
dependent variable, corresponding to the previous model of ROA, with Adjusted R-
square of 0,555, indicating 55% of the sample being explained by control variables. 
However, none of the corporate governance variables has an impact on ROA, with all of 
them having very small t-values and large Sig. values ranging from 0,069 to 0,877 with 
confidence interval of 5%. This denotes that corporate governance variables cannot 
reject Null Hypothesis, thus, they do not affect firm performance (ROA). However, 
size, leverage, solvency, volatility, capital risk, credit risk (except credit_risk4), and all 
years under investigation except for 2004 and 2005 seem to have an impact on ROA 
with the majority of them having a Sig. value close to zero. These variables, although 
they can reject Null Hypothesis, they increase or decrease ROA by little. Results here 
are the same as on the previous model of ROA, showing no impact of corporate 
governance on firm performance.  
Regression Analysis for ROE seems to have little predictive power, with Adjusted R-
square of only 0,072, indicating that only 7,2% of the dependent variable can be 
explained by the control variables, following the previous model of ROE which also 
had limited predictive power. However, some of the results are worth to be mentioned. 
Here again corporate governance variables do not affect ROE as all of them have Sig. 
values that exceed p-value of 0,05, with minimum equals to 0,076 (audit) and maximum 
of 0,875 (director compensation and ownership). Consequently, as CGQ didn’t have 
any impact on ROE, here also our model can’t find any of the corporate governance 
variables to have an influence on it, making them unable to reject Null Hypothesis. 
However, capital risk seems to affect firm performance as it has a positive relationship 
with ROE. The next variable that rejects the Null Hypothesis is credit_risk1, with Sig. 
value no more than the confidence interval and t-value of 4,717 in absolute value. 
Finally, volatility with a Sig. value of 0,005 shows to have an effect on ROE too, as it 
doesn’t exceed p-value. Results just confirm the previous ROE regression model which 
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also had a small predictive power and the same control variables to influence ROE, with 
corporate governance not being included in them. 
Like ROE model, P/E regression analysis doesn’t have a satisfactory predictive power 
as its Adjusted R-square is only 0,063, meaning that only 6% of the sample can be 
explained by control variables. The results here follow those of the previous model of 
P/E showing no effect of corporate governance variables on firm performance. In fact 
the only variables that could reject Null Hypothesis with a confidence interval of 5%, 
are, size which has a Sig. value that equals 0,035, credit_risk2 with a Sig. value of zero, 
and solvency with a Sig. value of 0,003.  None of the rest of the independent variables 
seems to have an impact on P/E and particularly on corporate governance practices, 
which are the main variables under investigation. Also this model couldn’t show any 
effect on firm performance as did the previous one, and neither doesn’t it have a strong 
predictive power. Thus, results may not be representative enough. 
Interpreting the above table, it is obvious that results follow the same logic with the 
previous model of Investment Return. Adjusted R-square shows that almost 51% of the 
sample is explained by independent variables.  In addition, it should be underlined that 
here corporate governance variables do not have an impact on firm performance as none 
of them has a lower p-value than that of confidence interval (5%). The variables that 
could reject Null Hypothesis are credit_risk1 and credit_risk2 with Sig. values of zero, 
leverage with p-values of 0,041, volatility with Sig. of 0,015, and last, all years when  
the dummy variable is 1 for each of them except for 2004. Nevertheless, corporate 
governance variables are not part of those that affect Investment Return confirming in 
that way the first results that CGQ had highlighted.  
Last of the tested variables on the statistical analysis is that of Tobin’s Q. In this one, a 
strong predictive power is expected along with an impact of corporate governance on 
firm performance, as the previous regression analysis of table 5. As it was predicted, the 
results of this model are credible enough, as the Adjusted R-square is 0,613, which 
displays that 61% of the sample can be explained by the control variables, similarly to 
the previous Tobin’s Q model. However, in contrast to CGQ, the sub-scores of 
corporate governance don’t have an impact on Tobin’s Q, as all of them exceed the 
confidence interval of 5%. Rest of the results follow the interpretation of the previous 
Tobin’s Q model, with size, leverage, solvency, capital risk, credit risk (except 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANK PERFORMANCE 2011 
 
38 
 
credit_risk3), and years 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, and 2009 having an impact on firm 
performance as all of them have Sig. values smaller than 0,05. Therefore, despite the 
fact that the majority of the variables affect Tobin’s Q, corporate governance subscores 
seem to have no impact on it, in contrast to CGQ. Regarding Multicollinearity, these 
models seem to have no problem, as for one more time VIF ≤ 10 for all variables. 
The overall outcome of the above regression analysis models showed no important 
relationship between firm performance and corporate governance, apart from Tobin’s Q, 
which seems to be affected by CGQ. However, it is worth noticing what the results are, 
especially for the last three years of the examined period, as these are considered to be 
the most crucial years regarding the global financial crisis. Tables that follow present 
regression analysis only for the years 2007, 2008, and 2009, keeping the same 
dependent and independent variables: 
 
Table 7: Regression Analysis of firm performance regarding CGQ for years 2007-2009: 
H0 = CGQ does not affect firm performance during years 2007 to 2009     
H1 = CGQ affect firm performance during years 2007 to 2009 
      
Variables              ROA           ROE               P/E         Inv _return     Tobin’s Q 
 t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
VIF 
(Constant) -2,641 
(0,009) 
-1,478 
(0,140) 
-2,382 
(0,018) 
-1,576 
(0,116) 
3,685 
(0,000) 
 
CGQ 0,049 
(0,961) 
0,438 
(0,662) 
0,808 
(0,419) 
0,157 
(0,875) 
1,109 
(0,268) 
1,392 
size 2,067 
(0,039) 
0,992 
(0,322) 
-0,642 
(0,521) 
1,216 
(0,225) 
3,963 
(0,000) 
1,975 
leverage 4,616 
(0,000) 
1,403 
(0,161) 
-0,580 
(0,562) 
1,114 
(0,266) 
-21,056 
(0,000) 
1,471 
solvency 2,686 
(0,007) 
1,000 
(0,318) 
2,522 
(0,012) 
0,904 
(0,366) 
-3,260 
(0,001) 
1,832 
volatility -4,906 
(0,000) 
-3,017 
(0,003) 
-0,454 
(0,650) 
-5,727 
(0,000) 
-4,845 
(0,000) 
1,696 
capital _risk 3,659 
(0,000) 
3,670 
(0,000) 
-0,079 
(0,937) 
3,310 
(0,001) 
1,982 
(0,048) 
1,732 
credit _risk1 -4,453 
(0,000) 
-1,476 
(0,141) 
-0,379 
(0,705) 
-2,243 
(0,025) 
-3,015 
(0,003) 
1,746 
credit _risk2 -11,204 
(0,000) 
-0,817 
(0,414) 
3,726 
(0,000) 
-4,535 
(0,000) 
-1,980 
(0,048) 
1,936 
credit _risk3 0,806 -0,756 -1,133 1,711 0,796 1,157 
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(0,421) (0,450) (0,258) (0,088) (0,426) 
credit _risk4 1,459 
(0,145) 
1,229 
(0,220) 
-0,765 
(0,445) 
0,920 
(0,358) 
0,759 
(0,448) 
1,147 
Y2008 -3,749 
(0,000) 
0,673 
(0,501) 
-0,157 
(0,876) 
2,432 
(0,015) 
-3,706 
(0,000) 
1,408 
Y2009 -0,219 
(0,827) 
0,053 
(0,958) 
-0,311 
(0,756) 
8,224 
(0,000) 
-3,408 
(0,001) 
1,858 
 
 ROA ROE P/E Inv _return Tobin’s Q 
Adjusted R-square 0,585 0,113 0,043 0,298 0,583 
F- value 45,665 5,042 2,427 14,482 45,432 
 
where, 
CGQ = Industry corporate governance rating, 
size = natural logarithm of Total Assets, 
leverage = Total Debt / Total Assets, 
solvency = Total Assets / Total Liabilities, 
volatility = Std. Deviation of stock returns, 
capital _risk = Capital Adequacy Ratio – Tier 1, 
credit _risk 1 = Non performing loans / Total loans, 
credit _risk2 = Net loan losses / Total loans, 
credit _risk3 = Consumer & Installment loans /Total loans, 
credit _risk4 = Commercial & Industrial loans /Total loans, 
Y2008=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2008 and 0 otherwise, 
Y2009=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year2009 and 0 otherwise. 
The above table presents results for the last three years of the examined period. For the 
first dependent variable, ROA, the predictive power of the model is almost 59%, with 
Adjusted R-square equals to 0,585. Once more corporate governance doesn’t affect firm 
performance, with Sig. value close to 1 exceeding by much the confidence interval of 
5%. However, the year 2008 seems to affect ROA negatively, with t-value equals to 
3,749 in absolute value and Sig. value of zero, in contrast to 2009, which shows no 
relationship to ROA.  Other than that, volatility, credit _risk1 and credit _risk2 affect 
negative ROA with Sig. values equal to zero, while size, leverage, solvency and capital 
_risk have a strong positive relationship with firm performance.  
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The second examined variable, ROE with a small predictive power of only 11%, seems 
only to be affected negatively by volatility and positive from capital _risk with Sig. 
values of almost zero. However, none of the years exhibit to have a relationship with 
firm performance, as their p-values exceed the confidence interval of 5%. In this case 
too, CGQ is not related to firm performance, just like in previous regression models for 
ROE. 
Third on the table is the P/E regression model. Its Adjusted R-square is only 0,043, 
which indicates a small predictive power. In contrast to previous variables, this one 
shows no relationship with any of the years 2008, and 2009. However, solvency and 
credit _risk2 seem to affect positive firm performance with Sig. values of 0,007 and 
zero, respectively. Again, firm performance seems not to be affected by CGQ, which is 
the main variable under investigation, along with the specific examined period.  
Investment return Regression Model with Adjusted R-square of 0,298 indicates a 
relatively poor predictive power. In addition, it seems that volatility, credit _risk1 and 
credit _risk2 have a strong negative relationship with it, however, the years under 
investigation have a positive relationship with Investment return as both of them have 
Sig. values that do not exceed the confidence interval (5%). Once more, CGQ is not 
included in the variables that affect firm performance. 
Last on the table is Tobin’s Q model with a strong predictive power of 58% (Adjusted 
R-square = 0,583). Tobin’s Q seems to be affected the most by the independent 
variables, however, in contrast to the previous Tobin’s Q model on table 5, this time it is 
not related to CGQ. Nevertheless, this variable has a strong negative relationship with 
the majority of the rest independent variables and particularly with leverage, solvency, 
volatility, credit _risk1 and credit _risk2, years 2008, and 2009, with Sig. values not 
higher than 0,007, while size and capital _risk affect firm performance positive. 
Multicollinearity test showed no worrying signs, as VIF is low, for all of the variables. 
Next follows a regression analysis, this time having subscores of corporate governance 
ratings, examining only the years 2007, 2008, and 2009.  
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Table 8: Regression Analysis of firm performance regarding subscores corporate 
governance for years 2007-2009: 
H0 = corporate governance subscores do not affect firm performance during years 2007 
to 2009     
H1 = corporate governance subscores affect firm performance during years 2007 to 
2009 
 
Variables                ROA           ROE             P/E        Inv _return    Tobin’s Q 
 t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
t 
(Sig.) 
VIF 
(Constant) -2,668 
(0,008) 
-1,488 
(0,137) 
-2,422 
(0,016) 
-1,493 
(0,136) 
3,650 
(0,000) 
 
board -0,161 
(0,872) 
-0,757 
(0,450) 
0,383 
(0,702) 
0,907 
(0,365) 
-0,205 
(0,838) 
1,556 
compensation -0,518 
(0,605) 
0,291 
(0,771) 
0,005 
(0,996) 
0,770 
(0,442) 
0,602 
(0,547) 
1,290 
takeover 1,266 
(0,206) 
1,097 
(0,273) 
-0,422 
(0,674) 
0,657 
(0,511) 
1,161 
(0,246) 
1,067 
audit 1,045 
(0,296) 
1,835 
(0,067) 
0,597 
(0,551) 
-0,391 
(0,696) 
1,118 
(0,264) 
1,227 
size 1,930 
(0,054) 
0,845 
(0,398) 
-0,582 
(0,561) 
0,698 
(0,486) 
3,777 
(0,000) 
2,133 
leverage 4,723 
(0,000) 
1,538 
(0,125) 
-0,561 
(0,575) 
1,101 
(0,272) 
-20,854 
(0,000) 
1,477 
volatility -5,060 
(0,000) 
-3,076 
(0,002) 
-0,402 
(0,688) 
-5,771 
(0,000) 
-4,847 
(0,000) 
1,739 
solvency 2,662 
(0,008) 
0,923 
(0,357) 
2,540 
(0,011) 
0,810 
(0,419) 
-3,298 
(0,001) 
1,844 
capital _risk 3,612 
(0,000) 
3,688 
(0,000) 
-0,066 
(0,948) 
3,267 
(0,001) 
1,976 
(0,049) 
1,739 
credit _risk1 -4,443 
(0,000) 
-1,477 
(0,140) 
-0,436 
(0,663) 
-2,136 
(0,033) 
-2,989 
(0,003) 
1,754 
credit _risk2 -11,125 
(0,000) 
-0,709 
(0,479) 
3,757 
(0,000) 
-4,575 
(0,000) 
-1,892 
(0,059) 
1,940 
credit _risk3 0,803 
(0,423) 
-0,674 
(0,501) 
-1,095 
(0,274) 
1,603 
(0,110) 
0,902 
(0,367) 
1,157 
credit _risk4 1,334 
(0,183) 
1,220 
(0,223) 
-0,688 
(0,492) 
0,918 
(0,359) 
0,786 
(0,433) 
1,159 
Y2008 -3,593 
(0,000) 
0,652 
(0,515) 
-0,179 
(0,858) 
2,411 
(0,016) 
-3,692 
(0,000) 
1,434 
Y2009 -0,076 
(0,939) 
0,093 
(0,926) 
-0,304 
(0,761) 
8,125 
(0,000) 
-3,371 
(0,001) 
1,890 
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 ROA ROE P/E Inv _return Tobin’s Q 
Adjusted R-square 0,585 0,113 0,043 0,298 0,583 
F- value 45,665 5,042 2,427 14,482 45,432 
 
where, 
board = sub-score of board corporate governance rating, 
compensation = sub-score of executive and director compensation and ownership 
corporate governance rating, 
takeover = sub-score of takeover defenses  corporate governance rating, 
audit = sub-score of audit corporate governance rating, 
 size = natural logarithm of Total Assets, 
leverage = Total Debt / Total Assets, 
solvency = Total Assets / Total Liabilities, 
volatility = Std. Deviation of stock returns, 
capital _risk = Capital Adequacy Ratio – Tier 1, 
credit _risk 1 = Non performing loans / Total loans, 
credit _risk2 = Net loan losses / Total loans, 
credit _risk3 = Consumer & Installment loans /Total loans, 
credit _risk4 = Commercial & Industrial loans /Total loans, 
Y2008=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year 2008 and 0 otherwise, 
Y2009=A dummy variable taking 1 if observations belong to year2009 and 0 otherwise. 
Results follow those of the previous regression analysis models. Here also, there seems 
to be no relation between corporate governance and firm performance, as none of the 
subscores have a Sig. value lower than the confidence interval (5%) for each of the 
dependent variables. In addition, ROA model, which again has a strong predictive 
power (Adjusted R-square = 0,585), shows to have a negative relation with volatility, 
credit _risk1, credit _risk2 and years 2008, and 2009, same as before, while size , 
leverage, solvency and capital _risk have a positive effect on it. Corporate governance 
subscores do not affect at all ROA, with relative high Sig. values, exceeding confidence 
interval of 5%. 
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ROE follows exactly the same path as in the previous model. With a low predictive 
power with the Adjusted R-square equal to 0,113, it tell us that none of the corporate 
governance variables is in any way affect ROE, while volatility has a negative effect on 
it and capital _risk a strong positive relation. Years 2008 and 2009 seem to have no 
relation to ROE, just like the corporate governance subscores mentioned earlier. 
The next variable of firm performance is P/E where again the Adjusted R-square shows 
a low predictive power. Only 4,3% of the sample is explained by control variables. For 
P/E only solvency and credit _risk2 show to have an effect on it, while neither corporate 
governance nor years 2008, and 2009 influence P/E, just like corporate governance 
subscores. 
For Inv _return Adjusted R-square points out that almost 30% of the dependent variable 
is explained by independent variables. This variable, although it shows no relation to 
corporate governance subscores, it has a negative relation with volatility, credit _risk1, 
credit _risk2, where all three variables have Sig. values of almost zero, indicating a 
strong relationship to Investment return. Analyzing the Sig. values of 0,001, 0,016 and 
zero of Capital _risk, and the years 2008, and 2009, respectively, it is apparent that they 
have a strong positive relation to Investment return. 
However, the most interesting of the dependent variables is once more Tobin’s Q 
model, which has a quite strong predictive power of 58% and the majority of the 
variables are related to it, but not corporate governance subscores. Here, all the years 
under investigation have a very strong negative relationship with Tobin’s Q as the Sig. 
value is zero. In addition, leverage, solvency, volatility, credit _risk1 are also related 
negatively to this variable, while size and capital _risk positively. Multicollinearity 
appears not to be alarming in these models either, as VIF is again much lower than 10. 
The last two regression models indicated no relation on bank performance either with 
CGQ or with corporate governance subscores. However, some of the dependent 
variables, such as ROA, and Tobin’s Q showed a strong negative relation with the years 
2008, and 2009. These variables have after all regression models with strong predictive 
power, showing to capture the tense atmosphere of the specific period. The rest of the 
dependent variables are either positive affected by the years 2008, or 2009, such as 
Investment return, or are not affected at all, such as ROE, and P/E. However, it is worth 
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mentioning, that their regression models appeared to have a relatively small or even 
poor predictive power. 
The results of this research suggest that corporate governance doesn’t seem to have an 
impact on firm performance in general, except for Tobin’s Q, which shows to be 
positively affected by CGQ, findings which are in accordance with previous researches 
( Klapper and Love, 2002, Brown and Caylor, 2004, Sanda et al., 2005, Sakawa and 
Watanabel, 2011)  However, the majority of the other independent variables, which are 
financial variables, seem to affect firm performance, as in both of our models, most of 
them reject Null Hypothesis. 
More specifically, capital risk, the majority of credit risk indicators, such as non 
performing loan to total loans and net loan losses to total loans, leverage, solvency, and 
volatility all have a significant impact on performance. This can be explained from the 
fact that financial ratios are connected to each other and possible fluctuations or changes 
to one of them can affect one another.  
Other than financial ratios, dummy variables for years 2007, 2008, and 2009 affect firm 
performance, as we saw both in regression analysis of all seven years, and especially for 
the last of them, where for most of the dependent variables, especially the years 2008 
and 2009 showed a strong link with them. This is not surprising, as during these years 
the recession deepened. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that especially for ROA 
and Tobin’s Q the relationship between them and the last years is increasing negatively. 
However, due to the limited previous research, we cannot compare these results to other 
empirical studies, although many economists and financial analysts have already stated 
that these years were the worse of the recent economic crisis, especially in US. 
In addition, size shows to have an impact on three out of five variables of firm 
performance, ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. These three variables have a positive 
relationship with size, as they increase when the size of banks increases. This finding is 
in accordance to the results of Abbas (2011), Leng (2004), and Sakawa and Watanabel 
(2011) who found that bank’s size has a positive effect on firm performance. 
Focusing on leverage and bank performance, findings exhibit a relationship between 
them, as for ROA, leverage has a positive impact on it, while for Investment Return and 
Tobin’s Q a negative one and especially for the last, which has a negative correlation of 
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almost 60%. These findings are in consistence to the results of Berger et al. (2002), who 
suggest that leverage affects firm performance and specifically that of banks. Another 
research that of Liargovas and Skandalis (2009) also confirms this relationship, 
indicating that leverage affects firm performance in small markets such that of Greece. 
Khatab et al.(2011) inferences also confirm this relationship, as they found leverage to 
be positively related to firm performance.  
Continuing with the results, the other financial indicator that is related to firm 
performance is solvency, as it did in Sels et al. (2006), who reported that the higher the 
solvency, the better the firm performs as it has more substantial  foundations in case of 
difficult times. Here also, solvency seems to have positive correlation with all five 
variables, with Tobin’s Q being affected the most.  
Regarding volatility, findings show that ROA, ROE, and Investment Return are affected 
by volatility, with all three of them having a negative correlation with it. Since there is 
no prior research on this variable, it is worth saying that the first two variables are 
affected negative by it, while Investment Return positive. 
Concerning capital risk, which also seems to have an impact on three of the dependent 
variables, ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q, we see that all of them are positively correlated 
to it. This was expected since the lower the capital risk, the higher the market value of 
the company, and thus its return on assets, and equity. Although, no research have 
found to examine capital risk of banks to their performance, the results of this research 
are also supported by the consensus that better capital organization increases firm’s 
value, in general. 
Next on independent variables that had an effect on firm performance is capital risk. 
However, as our sample consists only of banks, it was important to include financial 
ratios that would reflect credit risk regarding the banks’ reality. Thus, non performing 
loans to total loans, net loan losses to total loans, consumer and installment loans to 
total loans, and commercial and industrial loans to total loans were included. From 
these, the first two are important for four out of the five dependent variables of firm 
performance, with ROA, ROE, Investment Return, and Tobin’s Q having a negative 
correlation to them. As we don’t have any previous research to compare our results 
with, we could suggest that their negative relationship with credit risk was expected, as 
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the higher credit risk the lower the profitability of a bank, especially for the last years of 
the period under examination.  
Last on the interpretation is left the primary variable under investigation, corporate 
governance. The first model showed no effect on firm performance variables except for 
Tobin’s Q. Although their correlation is not strong enough, the statistic results show a 
positive relation between them, as CGQ helps firm performance to increase, for the 
period 2003-2009. This is in accordance to Klapper and Love(2004), who found that 
better corporate governance is highly correlated with better market valuation (Tobin’s 
Q).  However, something similar doesn’t seem to occur when it comes to corporate 
governance subscores rating. Here, none of the dependent variables are influenced by 
corporate governance practices for both of the examined periods, a conclusion that is in 
contrast to the findings of Ertugrul and Hedge (2009) who viewed sub-ratings to be 
more informative than summary corporate governance scores. It is also opposite to the 
La Porta et al. (1999) results, who suggest that countries with higher corporate 
governance standards have higher firm performance. Nevertheless, they coincide with 
the findings of Lamport et al. (2011), who found no significant relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. In addition, the inferences of this research, 
regarding ROE, appears also to be in contradiction to previous researches, as that of Len 
(2004), who detected a positive relation of this variable to corporate governance. 
Concluding, the overall outcome of this research is in accordance to previous literature 
(Cheffins, 2009, Lamport et al, 2011), discouraging a strong association of corporate 
governance to bank performance, an only one of the five dependent variables presented 
a relationship with corporate governance. 
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V. Conclusion 
The present investigation was motivated by the increasing attention drawn by corporate 
governance over the last years and a possible association of the implicated mechanisms 
to international firm performance that dictated the recent global financial crisis. The 
importance of corporate governance is widely recognized by both, academics and 
economic practitioners. Transparency and disclosure of a company’s information, 
protection of shareholders’ rights, adequate stakeholders participation in “decision 
making”, the boards accountability and its structure, remuneration practices and 
adequate supervision of managers by the board, reflect the foundation of any sound 
corporate authority. However, corporate governance is characterized by a general lack 
of principles and an inability of the system to enforce legislative guidelines. These very 
shortcomings of corporate governance are considered by many to have fostered the 
current recession. 
This study represents a systematic attempt in unveiling evidence on whether or not 
corporate governance mechanisms affect banks performance, by using corporate 
governance total ratings as well as their subscores, along with several financial 
measures. The research was based on 169 publicly traded US banks, examined over a 
seven-year period (2003-2009).  
The findings suggest there is no considerable relationship of corporate governance and 
banks performance, regardless their ratings, being in accordance to OECD’s conclusion 
(OECD, 2010) that “existing corporate governance principles provided a good basis to 
adequately address the key concerns that have been raised and that there was no urgent 
need for them to be revise, rather than to be implemented better”. A careful observation 
of the results contradict, that even though there is no dependency of ROA, ROE, P/E, 
and Investment Return either to CGQ rating nor to their subscores, Tobin’s Q seems to 
exhibit a positive relationship with CGQ Industry rating, as it increases market value 
(Tobin’s Q) during 2003-2009. However, no other evidence indicates that better 
governed banks operate superiorly than the rest, despite the fact that recent years have 
shown an emerging interesting for better corporate governance practices, their direct 
implementation, and control by stricter regulations. The foregoing analysis denoted a 
negative relationship of the variables ROA, and Tobin’s Q to bank performance 
especially over the period of 2006-2009. This was however expected, as these years 
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connote the critical period of the global economic crisis, thus performance would 
foreseeable be affected negatively. 
When considering possible limitations of this investigation, insufficient financial and 
corporate governance data could/should be indicated, as these led to the selection of 169 
banks over thousands of US publicly traded financial institutions. Increasing the number 
of banks in the used sample would provide a general view. Furthermore, the research 
was limited to the US, a fact that may have impaired our ability to redact the results to a 
global scale. The US is however considered as the origin of the crisis and hence a 
mature candidate to act as a representative sample capable of unveiling general 
conclusions. Moreover, a wide range of corporate governance measures was reflected 
within this investigation, thus increasing reliability, as only trustworthy databases, such 
as Thomson One Banker and Corporate Governance Quotient were considered. 
To the best of our knowledge, this research is one of few exploring the relationship of 
corporate governance and bank performance using both summary ratings and sub-
scores, over both, a seven years followed by a sub-three year period. In this way, the 
buildup of the financial crisis as well as its peak was properly captured.  
Further research and better corporate governance implementation, might reveal a 
potential correlation of CGQ Industry ratings to bank performance, thus contributing to 
the prevention a future economic meltdown.      
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